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Abstract: From a formal evaluation of a capitation-based NHS dental contract, as 
part of a National Institute of Health Research funded project (HS&DR 14/19/12), 
data collected from a series of qualitative interviews suggest that General Dental 
Practitioners (GDPs) may behave differently in ways that vary from the results of 
previous studies. Drawing on realist methodology, a rapid realist review (RRR) was 
conducted enabling us to develop a programme theory to explain the effect of a 
capitation pilot on NHS dentists working in primary care. In essence, our theory 
postulates that GDPs are affected by a number of competing interests and incentives 
and that this can influence their behaviour in a variety of ways. For example, a 
capitation based contract may result in some GDPs focusing more on prevention, as 
opposed to treatment, but for others it may not. It may, in practice, dis-incentivise 
some GDPs to perform certain treatments, whilst for other it may lead to them 
making no change to their clinical practice. Further research is required to fully 
understand the causal mechanisms associated with this divergent behaviour as well 
as the underlying contextual conditions through which these mechanisms are 
activated. 
 
 
Background: The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety 
(DHSSPS) in Northern Ireland recently piloted a capitation based National Health 
Service (NHS) primary dental contract in 11 practices across the province. Its aim 
was to assess whether remuneration based on capitation, as opposed to the existing 
Fee-For-Service (FFS) contract, can control costs, promote prevention and improve 
the quality of care provided to patients. General Dental Practitioners (GDPs) can be 
acutely sensitive to incentives within dental contracts (Tickle et al, 2011; Brocklehurst 
et al, 2012; McDonald et al 2012). FFS, where the GDP submits a claim for every 
single item of completed treatment, has been shown to lead to over-treatment in 
order to maximize profit (Birch, 1988; Chalkley and Tiley, 2006; Tickle et al, 2011). 
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Per-capita remuneration systems can reduce the financial risk to the NHS, but this 
can be at the cost of patient-selection (skimping and dumping) as well as under-
treatment (Ellis and McGuire, 1993; Gosden et al, 2000; Grytten, 2005). 
 
Within a formal evaluation of the dental pilot, as part of a National Institute of Health 
Research funded project (HS&DR 14/19/12), one of the three work-streams involved 
conducting a series of qualitative face-to-face interviews with GDPs and stakeholders 
from the DHSSPS and the Health and Social Care Board (HSCB) who have been 
involved in the pilot. Semi-structured interviews were conducted face-to-face with the 
11 practice principles and via telephone with 8 associate dentists. Interviews were 
recorded and then transcribed verbatim. Thematic analysis of individual transcripts 
was undertaken by three researchers. Analysis involved coding transcripts using 
NVivo software and identifying themes. A constant comparative method was used to 
interpret the data. Key themes were identified using an open coding method. 
 
The interviews revealed certain tensions and paradoxes which vary somewhat from 
the prevailing view in the literature identified above, as well as earlier studies 
conducted at times of contractual change in the delivery of primary dental care within 
the NHS (Lennon et al, 1990). Half of the GDPs, for example, suggested that the 
pilot had enabled them to focus more on prevention as opposed to treatment, 
whereas the remainder stated that the pilot had not had this effect. Furthermore, one 
third of the GDPs argued that the pilot had, in practice, dis-incentivised performing 
certain treatments, whilst the remainder said they had made no change to their 
clinical practice. With a view to explaining these different perspectives, a rapid realist 
review (RRR) of evidence was conducted to develop a theoretical account of how 
and why the capitation pilot has affected GDPs’ behaviour in different ways.  
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Methodology 
The use of realist methodology is becoming increasingly popular in health services 
research (Rycroft-Malone et al 2012), as it recognises the need to show how and 
why interventions work, as opposed to merely evaluating whether they work or not. 
Realist reviews of evidence attempt to provide policy makers and practitioners with a 
theory (referred to by realists as a programme theory) to shed light on what it is 
about a particular intervention “that works, for whom and in what circumstances” 
(Pawson and Tiley, 1997). Programme theories are, in essence, causal explanations 
that are expressed, in realist methodology, as relationships between context, 
mechanisms, and outcomes (Pawson and Tiley, 1997; Pawson 2006). More 
specifically they seek to explain how variations in context may trigger causal 
mechanisms to generate particular outcomes. In comparison to a Cochrane-style 
systematic review (Brocklehurst et al, 2012), where the included studies are limited 
to those of an experimental or quasi-experimental design, realist methodology 
enables a broader range of approaches to be included - the intention being to 
disentangle the heterogeneity and complexity of an intervention.  Rapid Realist 
Reviews (RRRs) have been developed to enable policy-makers to respond to time-
sensitive and emerging issues, preserving the application of realist methods, albeit in 
a more condensed form (Saul et al, 2013; Tsang et al, 2016). Previous RRRs adhere 
to four broad overlapping classifications: guiding rules for policy making; knowledge 
quantification; understanding tensions/ paradoxes in the evidence base; and, 
reinforcing or refuting beliefs and decisions taken (Saul et al, 2013). We used RRR in 
this paper to understand the tensions and paradoxes that have emerged from our 
evaluation of the capitation pilot which conflict with the literature identified above. To 
the best of our knowledge, our review represents the first attempt to apply realist 
methods to evidence within dentistry. 
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Design: The design was focused on developing a theoretical explanation of why the 
capitation pilot had affected GDPs’ behaviour in different ways.  Heterogeneous data, 
as well opinion papers and reports, were included. Guidance towards relevant 
literature and ‘sense checking’ of the theories we developed was provided by a 
content expert group comprising senior members of the DHSSPS in Northern Ireland 
as well as senior academics in the field of health services research within dentistry. 
We conducted our RRR in accordance with the standards and guidelines emerging 
from the RAMESES project (Wong et al 2013), which has established quality and 
publication standards, as well as training materials for realist research. 
 
We began the review by discussing the results from our qualitative interviews with 
our content expert group who suggested that we consult two specific sources of 
literature concerning how GDPs have responded to previous changes in dental 
contracts (Tickle et al, 2011; Harris et al, 2015). Analysis of these sources identified 
a number of key insights that, we agreed, could be used to explain why the capitation 
contract piloted in HS&DR 14/19/12 may have caused GDPs to behave differently. 
These insights are presented below in Table 1.  
 
 
From Rebecca Harris et al (2015)  
“We found that dentists have several concerns which they have to bear in mind in their work: being 
responsible for keeping the practice going for the sake of staff and patients, providing high-quality care 
according to professional standards… and running their practice as a business in a profitable way” (p. 
xvii). 
 
“Loopholes have been exposed where practitioners appear to exploit vagueness in the language of the 
contract to benefit their self-interest” (p.xvii). 
 
“Social and professional networks in particular may be a powerful way in which opportunism is 
constrained, a mechanism which is currently relatively unexplored” (p.116). 
 
 
 
Table 1. Key insights into the effects of capitation on GDPs’ behaviour 
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From Tickle et al (2011): 
“Economic theory suggests that the way people are paid influences their working patterns and there is a 
large body of evidence, particularly in the context of medicine, to support this theory. At the same time, it 
has been argued that professional codes and norms may dilute or eliminate the uptake of perverse 
financial incentives which encourage professionals to provide care that is sub-optimal” (p.465). 
 
 
By combining these insights with our wider knowledge of dentistry, policy and health 
services research, we embarked on an iterative process of developing and adjusting 
our initial programme theory (IPT). The final version of this IPT was split into three 
different domains and is presented below in Table 2.  
 
 
IPT 1. GDPs are affected by a number of competing interests: a responsibility to keep their practice 
going for the benefit of patients and staff; providing quality care; and running their business 
profitably. 
IPT 2. Where loopholes, opportunities and perverse financial incentives exist, exploitation may occur 
in order to benefit GDPs’ self-interests.    
IPT 3. The existence of professional and social networks as well as professional codes and norms 
may constrain the impact of opportunism. 
 
 
Search: We then moved to refine our initial programme theory by searching for 
supporting evidence, or evidence which helped us to further modify our theory in light 
of further insights. Due to the rapid nature of this review, and the fact that we both 
time and resource limited, we restricted our search to two databases. Nevertheless, 
engagement with relevant stakeholders and use of the research-knowledge of the 
project group ensured that key theoretical contributions in the literature were 
identified and included. Knowledge and insight here was bolstered by the fact that a 
comprehensive systematic review of the literature had also been completed prior to 
the start of HS&DR 14/19/12 (Brocklehurst et al, 2012). 
 
Table 2. Initial programme theory 
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We searched MEDLINE and WEB OF SCIENCE. Citation searching and snowballing 
was also used. There were no geographic or date limitations but English language 
papers only were considered.  Our searches focused on the dental literature, as well 
as the wider health care and public administration literature. The bibliographic 
searches were performed in February 2017. The search terms were derived from the 
3 domains and from discussions within the project team (see Table 3). All study 
designs were included in order to perform an in-depth exploration of the factors 
which affect how GDPs behave when remunerated via a capitation contract. The 
results of the searches are summarised in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Exclusion criteria 
 
Studies not written in English 
Studies that include participants which are not human 
Studies that did not inform the initial programme theory  
Search terms used:  
 
IPT 1 
MEDLINE search: 
1. (MH "Dentists") OR TI dentist* OR AB dentist*  
2. (MH "Contracts") OR (MH "Practice Management, Dental") OR AB (contract* OR business 
OR practice) OR TI (contract* OR business OR practice)  
3. (MH "Social Responsibility") OR (MH "Dentists/ST") OR (MH "Quality of Health Care/ST") 
OR (MH "Motivation") OR AB (profit* OR incentive* OR motivation* OR targets OR standards 
OR loyalty OR obligations OR “social responsibility*” OR “social contract”) OR TI (profit* OR 
incentive* OR motivation* OR targets OR standards OR loyalty OR obligations OR “social 
responsibility*” OR “social contract”)  
4. 1 AND 2 AND 3 = 767 results in EBSCO Medline 15/02/17 
 
IP 2 
MEDLINE search: 
1.  (MH "Dentists") OR TI dentist* OR AB dentist*  
2. AB (gaming OR self-interest OR “self interest” OR opportunism) OR TI (gaming OR self-
interest OR “self interest” OR opportunism)  
3. 1 AND 2 = 14 results 
4. (MH “Capitation Fee”) OR (MH “Fees and Charges”) OR (MH “Reimbursement 
Mechanisms”) OR TI (contract or capitation OR salary OR fee* OR reimbursement) OR AB 
(contract or capitation OR salary OR fee* OR reimbursement) 
Table 3. Exclusion criteria and search terms  
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5. TI behavio#r OR AB behavio#r 
6. 1 AND 4 AND 5 = 134 results 
7. 3 or 6 = 146 results in EBSCO Medline 15/02/17 
 
IPT 3 
MEDLINE SEARCH 1 
1. (MH "Dentists") OR TI dentist* OR AB dentist*  
2. (MH "Social Support") OR TI ("social network*" OR "professional network*" OR 
"professional norms" OR team-working OR “team working” OR “local dental network*” OR 
“local professional network*”) OR AB ("social network*" OR "professional network*" OR 
"professional norms" OR team-working OR “team working” OR “local dental network*” OR 
“local professional network*”)  
3. 1 AND 2 = 180 results in EBSCO Medline 15/02/17 
MEDLINE SEARCH 2 
1. (MH "Health Personnel+") OR TI/AB ( ("health care" OR "healthcare" OR "health 
services") N2 staff ) OR TI/AB ( "health personnel" OR "health professional*" OR "medical 
staff" OR workforce OR "professional practice" )  
2. TI/AB ( "social network*" OR "professional network*" OR "professional norms" )  
3. Ti/AB ( "professional behaviour" OR "professional behavior" OR collegial* OR "public 
service motivation" OR "public service belief" OR professionalism OR collaboration OR 
cooperat* OR co-operat* OR community )  
4. 1 AND 2 AND 3 = 290 results 06/04/17 
 
WEB OF SCIENCE CORE COLLECTION SEARCH 
1. TOPIC: ("health personnel" OR "health professional*" OR "medical staff")  
2. TOPIC: ("social network*" OR "professional network*" OR "professional norms")  
3. TOPIC: ("professional behaviour" OR "professional behavior" OR collegial* OR "public 
service motivation" OR "public service belief" OR professionalism OR collaboration OR 
cooperat* OR co-operat* OR community) 
4. 1 AND 2 AND 3 = 138 results 06/04/17 
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Data Extraction: A data extraction tool was adapted and used to guide the capture 
of relevant data to inform programme theory development. Extracted data were 
discussed at regular meetings to articulate how the findings helped to support or 
modify the IPT.  
 
Results: The review identified 12 full-text articles that were relevant to/and informed 
the IPT, a descriptive overview of which is presented in Appendix 1.  
Record identified through focused and 
broad database searching 
(n=1580) 
Additional records identified through 
citation searching 
(n=5) 
Records screened 
(n=1585) 
Records excluded 
(n=1513) 
Full text articles assessed for eligibility 
(n=71) 
Full text articles excluded 
(n=60) 
Sources included in RRR 
(n=12) 
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Fig 1. PRISMA flow diagram 
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The sources identified helped to support and refine each domain in a number of 
ways enabling us to reformulate and modify the IPT to be more reflective of the 
evidence we collected though searching the wider literature. (See Table 4 below). 
 
 
Initial Programme Theory Modified Programme Theory 
IPT 1. GDPs are affected by a number of 
competing interests: a responsibility to 
keep their practice going for the benefit of 
patients and staff; providing quality care; 
and running their business profitably. 
 
MPT1.   GDPs are affected by a number of competing 
interests, including: a responsibility to keep their 
practice going for the benefit of patients and staff; 
serving people and providing quality care; and 
running their business profitably. The balance 
between these interests may shift over time due 
to increased commercial necessity. 
Entrepreneurialism is not just connected to profit 
maximisation, but also to the need to maintain 
cash flow. 
IPT 2. Where loopholes, opportunities and 
perverse financial incentives exist, 
exploitation may occur in order to benefit 
GDPs’ self-interests    
 
MP2.      Where loopholes, opportunities and perverse 
financial incentives exist, exploitation may occur 
in order to prevent financial loss or to bring about 
financial gain. Whilst this exploitation could be 
linked to self-interest, it could also be driven by 
the desire to keep the practice going for the sake 
of patients and staff. 
IPT 3. The existence of professional and social 
networks as well as professional codes 
and norms may constrain the impact of 
opportunism. 
 
MPT3.   The existence of professional and social networks, 
professional norms and the presence of a strong 
professional ethic may constrain the impact of 
opportunism. 
 
 
 
With respect to IPT 1, the notion that GDPs are affected by a number of competing 
concerns resonated with all of the identified sources (Baumrind, 2007; Öcek and 
Vatansever, 2014; Nash, 2015). An additional concern - “to serve people” - was also 
introduced, as was the idea that GDPs’ priorities may shift over time towards 
commercialism (Öcek and Vatansever, 2014). In other words, whilst the primary 
motivation for becoming a GDP might be to serve patients, a more commercial 
Table 4. Modified Programme Theory  
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motivation may emerge once the pressures of trying to earn a living, or run a 
practice, start to be felt as a GDP. Furthermore, this pressure has arguably increased 
over the last 70 years as society has generally become more commercial (Baumrind, 
2007; Nash, 2015). In relation to this, the wider evidence also suggests that “a sense 
of market” and an entrepreneurial spirit do not just feed into a desire to generate 
profit; they are also presented here as tools for helping to maintain cash-flow (Öcek 
and Vatansever, 2014).  
 
IP2 posited the idea that GDPs’ exploitation of opportunities and loopholes was 
linked to self-interest. This is supported by the literature (McDonald et al, 2012; 
Hartshorne and Hasegawa 2003; House of Commons Health Select Committee 
2008; Davies and Macfarlane 2006) - although it may be slightly more nuanced - the 
suggestion being that GDPs’ self-interest has at least two components in that the 
exploitation of opportunities or loopholes may be about the prevention of loss as well 
as financial gain, as suggested above. Consequently, GDPs “may seek alternatives 
such as over-servicing or unnecessary treatment to generate income and to improve 
their cash flow/and or profit” (Hartshorne and Hasegawa 2003). Furthermore, given 
the original insight from IPT1 - that GDPs care about keeping the practice going for 
the sake of their staff and patients (Harris et al 2015) - such exploitation might also 
be linked to this wider concern as opposed to mere self-interest.  
 
The notion expressed in IP3, that the impact of opportunism is constrained by 
professional and social networks as well as professional codes and norms, is 
supported (Andersen 2009) and developed further by the evidence we found in the 
literature (Plant, 2003; Raynor, 2011). For example, because GDPs provide a public 
service, the assumption is “that there is a common good/purpose within the 
service/organisation to be pursued and that this will either constrain or displace 
sectional interest” (Plant 2003). Put differently, central to the delivery of public 
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services is “an allegiance of professionals to an ethos of public service” (Rayner et al 
2011). This includes a commitment to certain values such as accountability, integrity, 
impartiality, and crucially, the adherence to the idea of a public interest distinct from 
private concerns (Rayner et al, 2011). In addition, and with respect to the notion that 
social networks may provide a mitigating factor against opportunism, we found 
evidence of one GDP reflecting on the fact that their particular practice is situated in 
a small community where they know their patients and “a percentage of them are 
friends” (Harris and Holt, 2013). Consequently, the depth of these particular 
community ties made them less likely to view their patients as a commodity that 
could be exploited for financial reasons. 
. 
Discussion: Employing the rapid realist review approach enabled us to develop a 
modified programme theory (MPT) about why changing something fundamental like 
the way in which GDPs are paid affects their behaviour differently. Typically, realist 
methodology would have us elaborate this programme theory in terms of the way in 
which different contexts and their associated causal mechanism lead to the kinds of 
divergent outcomes we have seen in our evaluation of a capitation-based NHS 
dental contract. This elaboration would then be subject to a further round of testing 
and refinement against the available literature. Whilst we do not have the space here 
to undertake this activity, there are a number of observations we can make about this 
next step relating to the notion of context, mechanism and divergent outcome 
patterns – in other words, why GDPs behave differently under a capitation based 
contract. 
 
In short, our programme theory suggests that GDPs’ response to a change in the 
way they are paid varies for the kinds of reasons outlined above. What underpins this 
is a series of ideas about how individuals and the social structures in which they 
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operate are related and, in turn, the extent to which these relationships affects a 
person’s actions (Bhaskar, 2013). 
 
First, not all GDPs work within the same institutional structures. Since the 
establishment of the General Dental Service, GDPs have been independent 
contractors to the NHS, owning their premises, employing their own staff and paying 
their expenses from their income. NHS contractual terms permit practices to provide 
a mixture of NHS and private care. On average, GDPs spend 75% of their time 
providing services to the NHS (Harris and Holt, 2013). The majority of GDPs in the 
UK work in professional partnerships alongside other GDPs, although a third are 
single-handed practices where just one GDP owns the practice and provides all of 
the care (Kravitz and Treasure, 2008). In addition, as part of NHS changes made in 
2006, the Government made it easier for practices to be owned by external 
commercial organisations. This has recently given rise to several large commercial 
chains which now provide dental care under a corporate model (Watson, 2016).  
 
Hence, structural arrangements regarding the delivery of primary care dentistry in the 
UK are mixed.  Crucially, these different structural arrangements give rise to different 
institutional logics, in other words “the predominating beliefs that create connections 
and a common purpose allowing those within a field a sense of grounding, orthodoxy 
and habituated normalcy” (Harris and Holt 2013). Dentistry appears to be governed 
by a range of at least three kinds of institutional logics: a professional clinical ethic; a 
business minded approach; and commercial opportunism, whereby care is 
commoditised (Harris et al, 2015). Whilst the dominance of one logic over another is 
likely to vary from practice to practice, we can imagine these logics mapping roughly 
onto the different kinds of institutional structures described above. As such, 
commercial opportunism may be more heavily associated with the large commercial 
chains and the attachment to a professional clinical ethic (as the operative decision-
14 
 
making concern) may be more common in small practices, especially the single-
handed variety. Although this contention constitutes something of a theoretical leap, 
it relates to the theory expressed above that a number of GDPs of are driven initially 
by a desire to serve and help people and don’t set out to be business owners (Öcek 
and Vatansever, 2014). Given that priorities may shift over time due to the 
commercial realities of running a business, it is plausible to imagine that where the 
practice remains small, cash flow and financial management may be less of a 
concern therefore negating the need to take advantage of commercial opportunities. 
 
Second, although institutional structures and their associated logics affect individual 
behaviour there is also the role of human agency to consider, in particular our 
purported ability to employ reflexive self-monitoring (Bhaskar, 2014) and choose a 
course of action from among various alternatives. In other words, we have the 
capacity to judge what we should do in a particular set of circumstances and then act 
upon such a judgement (Donagan, 1985), if we so wish. Consequently we are able to 
accept or reject the influence of a particular institutional logic and behave contrary to 
the prevailing wisdom. (Not all GDPs in a commercially minded practice will 
necessarily follow the dictates of commercialism all of the time, for example).  
 
Moreover, the acceptance or rejection of a particular institutional logic might not be 
as deliberate as this. There are many things that we do as individuals - out of habit 
as opposed to a considered judgement. This may also affect the ability of a prevailing 
institutional logic to determine individuals’ behaviour. 
 
Finally, the relationships GDPs have with each other (both with their immediate 
colleagues and professional peers) means that there is always the potential for 
someone to govern and affect the actions of another (Taylor-Gooby et al, 2000). The 
preferences of a principal may influence an associate’s clinical behaviour. But 
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equally, a principal’s relationship with those around them may generate sense of 
responsibility for keeping a practice going, for the sake of the staff they employ, and 
influence their decision-making in certain situations. As we noted above in MPT 2, 
some GDPs may exploit loopholes in contracts for this very reason.  
 
Furthermore, the relationship GDPs have with their patients also provides additional 
context here. Again, as noted above, with respect to MPT 3, GDPs operate under the 
influence of different social networks. And so, GDPs in an inner city practice with a 
high throughput of patients might have a very different relationship to those patients 
compared to a GDP operating in a rural setting, whose patients may even be their 
neighbours and friends (Harris and Holt 2013). As noted above, therefore, the depth 
of these particular community ties might make them more or less likely to view their 
patients as a commodity that could be exploited for financial reasons. 
 
In summary then, the above discussion enables us to understand more about why 
capitation might affect different GDPs differently. Whilst GDPs can be acutely 
sensitive to incentives within dental contracts the subtle contextual variations and 
their associated causal mechanisms means that not all GDPs will necessarily behave 
in the same way when the terms of their remuneration are altered. 
 
Conclusion: Our aim in this paper has been to explore how and why capitation 
affects GDPs’ behaviour. By conducting our RRR, we have shed light on the 
apparent tensions and paradoxes raised in the introduction – namely that the results 
of the qualitative interviews conducted as part of HS&DR 14/19/12 vary from the 
results of previous studies. To this end, our findings suggest that the effects on 
GDPs’ behaviour of changing the way in which they are paid is perhaps more 
complex and nuanced than previously realised. As such, this novel approach to the 
review of evidence has clearly been a helpful exercise. Nevertheless, despite this 
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strength, we acknowledge that the dental contract that was evaluated as part of 
HS&DR 14/19/12 was only piloted in 11 dental practices in Northern Ireland and 
hence the pool of data collection here is quite small. Moreover, a RRR is not as 
comprehensive as a full synthesis and we have only been able to focus here on 
theory development and modification. Although we have begun to illustrate how 
various social contexts underlie our programme theory, further research is now 
required to comprehensively test and refine the observations made above.  
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IPT 1. GDPs are affected by a number of competing interests: a responsibility to keep their practice going for the benefit of patients 
and staff; providing quality care; and running their business profitably. 
Name, date, country Paper type Study Design Evidence Relevance to theory 
Ocek and Vatansever 
(2014), Turkey 
Primary research Qualitative: focus groups 
(n=4) and semi-structured 
interviews (n=31). 
To explore the perceptions 
of Turkish dentists in 
respect of their professional 
identity and of the effects of 
market orientation in 
dentistry 
“All participants who either chose dentistry as their 
secondary choice after medicine or as their first choice 
explained that their main motive in choosing their future 
profession was the desire to serve people. None of the 
participants emphasized becoming a businessperson as a 
motive… However, there were also participants who 
explained, by giving examples from their own lives, that the 
identity of dentists was inevitably affected by 
entrepreneurship” (p599). 
 
“The most important difficulty of entrepreneurship was 
defined as the effort shown to attain recompense for their 
labor and to protect the income- expense balance: 
‘There are some expenses in the clinic. The dentist must 
somehow cover these. While I am face to face with the 
patient, I should think about how to get money from him or 
what to do to run my office. Inevitably, a sense of market is 
formed’” (p601). 
 
 
Suggests an additional interest – namely, that for 
some, the primary motivation for becoming a 
dentist is to ‘serve people’. 
 
Suggest that motivation may shift over time 
towards commercialism once the realities of 
running a practice start to be felt. 
 
Introduces the sense that entrepreneurship is 
required not just for the generation of profit, but 
also to help “run” a dental practice and protect the 
“income-expense” balance (cash flow). 
 
 
 
Baumrind (2006), 
USA 
Opinion Piece N/A “During the 60 years since the end of World War II, the 
practice of dentistry, like that of medicine, has been largely 
transformed from a “calling,” as Dr. Charles Bertalami, now 
Dean of the New York University College of Dentistry, 
described it several years ago, into a cog in the ever-
expanding Healthcare Industry. We have become part of an 
Industry! And in the process, the distinction between 
professional ethics and the ethics of commerce has been 
attenuated and, to a large extent, lost. I argue that today’s 
dentist is faced more strongly than ever before with an 
inherent conflict between the classical pledge of the health 
profession to hold patients’ interests primary, and above all, 
to do no harm, on the one hand—and the necessary, 
personally self-protective commercial principle of caveat 
emptor. 
 
Among the forces driving deleterious changes to our 
profession, there has been a massive increase in pressures 
towards commercialism, especially from the federal 
Suggests that the balance between competing 
interests has shifted since the 2nd world war 
towards commercialism and away from the 
prevalence of the professional ethic.  
 
Whilst the alleged pressure from the “federal 
government” and “insurance industry” are 
contextual factors that are specifically relevant to 
the USA, the claim that the balance has also been 
affected by “professional fees”, “cost[s] of 
production”, “[increased] overhead[s]”, and the 
repayment of “student loans”, would also seem to 
apply to dentistry in the UK.  
Appendix 1. Data extraction  
20 
 
government and from the insurance industry.  
 
There have also been increasingly unfavorable changes in 
the ratio between professional fees and the cost of 
production. When I started in dentistry in 1950, I opened my 
office in Berkeley on $1,500, and my over- head was 23%. 
As an older observer, I shudder to think how much it costs 
to open a dental office nowadays. Overhead has risen until 
it approximates 75% in some practices. To me, such a nut 
seems a strong impediment to altruistic thought. It’s very 
hard to give away your services, especially when you are 
still paying off your student loans. I may seem to be be 
laboring the obvious, but I think this needs to be said” 
(p.168) 
Nash (2015), USA  Opinion Piece N/A “In surveying the environment of dentistry today, it becomes 
obvious that, in contrast to the views of Adam Smith and 
other notable scholars previously identified, dentistry is 
existing in the marketplace of health care. For-profit 
corporations have become significantly involved in the 
delivery system; dentists understand themselves to be the 
proprietors of small businesses; students are graduating 
from dental schools with significant levels of debt, 
essentially coercing them to focus on making money—lots 
of money” (p.9). 
 
“Practice management courses encourage dentists to set 
daily revenue goals for their practices (p.10).” 
 
Suggests that dentistry has become more 
commercially orientated with a focus on making 
money. 
 
There are several factors that explain this shift: the 
prevalence of “for-profit corporations” in the 
delivery of healthcare; dentists’ perception of 
themselves as small businesses which is, in turn, 
influenced by things like their attendance on 
practice management courses; significant levels  of 
student debt. All of these factors seem applicable 
to dentistry in the UK. 
Taylor-Gooby et al. 
(2000), United 
Kingdom 
Primary research Mixed methods: Survey 
(n=2000). To provide 
information on the balance 
of NHS and private practice 
within the service. 
Semi structured interviews 
(n=56). To examine dentists’ 
reasons for seeking – or not 
seeking – to alter the 
balance of private and NHS 
practice. 
 
 
 
“Ideally you should be, as any other health care 
professional, totally committed to the patients’ well-being. 
But your entrepreneur has got to make to business work – 
these two things are in conflict” (p.390). 
 
“There’s always a trade-off between finance and health 
care” (p.390). 
 
Supports the idea that dentists have competing 
concerns. 
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IPT 2. Where loopholes, opportunities and perverse financial incentives exist, exploitation may occur in order to benefit GDPs’ self-
interests.    
 
Name, date, country Paper type Study Design Evidence Relevance to theory 
Davies and 
Macfralane (2010), 
United Kingdom
 
Primary research Qualitative: semi-structured 
interviews (n=12).  
To examine the influence of 
the post 2006 changes to 
dental contracts in England 
and its impact on dentist’s 
clinical decision making 
“It was felt to be ‘inevitable that the drive in the new contract 
is towards doing the least you can get away with in the 
category band.’ One interviewee stated that while over-
prescription represented a small minority of dentists 
working in the old system, ‘perverse incentives in the new 
contract will encourage a far greater cohort to under-
prescribe’ as dentists sought to do the minimum amount 
that they could to cross a UDA treatment band threshold. 
Game-playing and interpreting rules literally was felt to be 
inevitable when dentists are running businesses and are 
going to see a substantial loss by providing some treatment 
over others” (p.2). 
 
“Dentists currently risk making substantial losses by 
providing one treatment option over another and so, 
consciously or subconsciously, may advocate for example, 
extracting a tooth that might otherwise be retained with a 
root canal filling and crown if the financial implication of 
doing so were not so damaging” (p 4). 
Supports the idea that some dentists will exploit 
opportunities for self-interest – particularly the 
prevention of financial loss. 
 
 
Hartshorne & 
Hasegowa (2003), 
South Africa
 
Opinion piece N/A “Dentists may seek alternatives such as overservicing or 
unnecessary treatment to generate income and to improve 
their cash flow/and or profit. The main motives for 
overservicing are economic survival and financial gain” (p. 
364) 
 
Opportunism may be driven by either economic 
survival or financial gain. 
Mcdonald et al. 
(2012), United 
Kingdom
 
Primary research Qualitative: semi structured 
interviews (n=35) 
To explore the views of NHS 
dentists in England 
regarding reforms, which 
changed their incentive and 
payment structure. 
“Crown and bridgework all require expensive support from 
dental laboratory services. Dentists are paid a standard 
number of UDAs (12 UDAs for crowns, regardless of the 
number carried out), even though each procedure requires 
laboratory work that incurs costs for the dentist. This was 
also resulting in dentists making treatment decisions based 
on costs and income rather than on patient preferences or 
clinical factors. 
‘I’m not likely to be offering a bridge, where I used to offer a 
bridge. Purely because it’s costing me more in lab work and 
it’s just the nature of the beast. Yes, we should do it, but 
human nature tells you why are we going to be spending a 
lot of money on lab work?’” 
 
Supports the idea that some dentists will exploit 
opportunities for financial gain  
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House of Commons 
Health Committee 
(2008), United 
Kingdom 
 
Secondary analysis 
 
Government report using 
descriptive statistics.  
 
In relation to the changes to the English dental contract in 
2006, the report states: 
 
“The volume of more complex dental treatment 
administered by dentists within band three (requiring 
laboratory work such as 
crowns, bridges and dentures) has fallen sharply since 
2006. According to the Dental Laboratories Association 
(DLA), there had been a significant fall in Band 3 treatments 
requiring laboratory work in England during the first year of 
the new contract. The organisation told us that since 2006 
dental laboratories had experienced a decline of 57% in 
prescriptions for crowns and bridges and dentures, other 
than those replacing a single tooth” (p.32). 
 
Support the idea that some dentists will exploit 
opportunities. 
IPT 3. The existence of professional and social networks as well as professional codes and norms may constrain the impact of 
opportunism. 
 
Name, date, country Paper type Study Design Evidence Relevance to theory 
Anderson (2009), 
Denmark
 
Primary 
research/Secondary 
analysis 
Qualitative: semi-structured 
interviews (n=24) plus 
secondary analysis from 
surveys and register data.  
To analyse the effects of 
public service motivation, 
professional norms and 
economic incentives on the 
behaviour and performance 
of health professionals. 
The author refers to the example of the use of fissure 
sealants for which “no professional norm among dentists 
regulated this preventive measure at the time of 
investigation” (p. 90).  
 
Public dentists – whose choice of treatment is entirely 
unrelated to their remuneration – “used fissure sealing 
systematically”.  
 
However, in the case of private dentists, whose choice of 
treatment is inherently linked to their remuneration, only 
one interviewee was found to use this treatment  
 
However, when for example it comes to instructing children 
how to brush their teeth there is an agreed norm here that 
such instruction ought to be given. As such, the author 
found that the “performance of public and private dentists is 
 
The existence of agreed norms may also act as a 
mitigating factor against opportunism. 
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almost equal”. 
Raynor et al (2010), 
United Kingdom 
Primary research Questionnaires, distributed 
to: 
1. 100 senior public 
servants and 
academics.  
2. 300 public and private 
sector employees.  
3. 14 colleges.  
“A critical factor in the delivery of public services has been 
an allegiance of professionals to an ethos of public service. 
Values intrinsic to that are said to include commitment, 
accountability, integrity, impartiality, organizational 
citizenship behavior, and some notion of the public interest, 
distinct from private interests” (p. 27). 
 
“Generally, our article supports the validity of the construct 
and shows that experts in the field believe that there is such 
a thing as public service ethos” (p.43). 
 
 
 
Given that NHS dentists provide a public service, 
the presence of a public service ethos may also 
mitigate against opportunism.  
Plant (2003), United 
Kingdom 
Normative analysis N/A  “Individuals do not enter the public service out of concern 
for self-interest or personal utility maximisation. They may 
derive satisfaction from what they are doing but that is to be 
seen in terms of service rather than utility maximisation. 
The assumption here is that there is a common 
good/purpose within the service/organisation to be pursued 
and that this will either constrain or displace sectional 
interest” (p. 562).  
 
 
Given that NHS dentists provide a public service, 
the presence of a public service ethos may also 
mitigate against opportunism. 
Harris and Holt 
(2013), United 
Kingdom 
Primary 
Research/Secondary 
analysis 
Qualitative: semi-structured 
interviews (n=82) with a 
mixture of GDPs, dental 
team members, patients and 
commissioners. Plus 
secondary analysis from 
archival documents  
“I think one thing here is we are a small community. You’ve 
got to remember that. That people we see in the waiting 
room – a percentage of them are friends. You see them in 
shops” (p.67). 
The fact that dentists are situated in a local 
community may act as a mitigating factor against 
opportunism. 
 
 
 
